accusation was essential and that it was competent to delegate legislative power, in the very teeth of the settled significance of the fifth and sixth amendments and of other plainly applicable provisions of the Constitution; and second, because the cases relied upon all rested upon the conclusion that, for reasons found to result either from the text of the statutes involved or the subjects with which they dealt, a standard of some sort was afforded. Indeed, the distinction beween the cases relied upon and those establishing the general principle to which we have referred, and which we now apply and uphold as a matter of reason and authority, is so clearly pointed out in decided cases that we deem it only necessary to cite them. International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U. S. 216, 221; Collins v. Kentucky, 234 U. S. 634, 637; American Seeding Machine Co. v. Kentucky, 236 U.S. 660, 662; and see United States v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 242 U. S. 208, 237-238.

"(2) Defendant, in like manner, attacks the information because of the provisions of paragraph 3 of section 10, permitting the fixing of tolerances and exemptions (and possibly of variations) by rules and regulations promulgated by the Secretaries of the Treasury, Agriculture, and Commerce under section 3 of title 21. There is no allegation in the information of the promulgation of, nor the violation by defendant of, any such rules and regulations. only charge is a violation of the statute. Defendant, therefore, cannot raise

this point on motion to quash.

"(3) Defendant also demurs to the information, upon the ground that it is vague, indefinite, insufficient and fails to state an offense under the laws of the United States. I think if the statute in question is valid, the information is sufficient. If defendant desired more detailed information regarding the offense with which it is charged, its remedy was to call for bill of particulars.

"It seems unnecessary to discuss the other questions raised. The motion

to quash will, for the reason stated, be granted.

The information was dismissed in accordance with the above opinion.

ARTHUR M. HYDE, Secretary of Agriculture.

19637. Adulteration of salmon. U. S. v. 40 Cases, et al., of Canned Salmon. Consent decrees of condemnation. Product released under bond. (F. & D. Nos. 27398, 27633, 27634, 27635. I. S. Nos. 42914, 42918, 42919, 42920. S. Nos. 5601, 5675, 5676, 5677.)

Samples of canned salmon taken from the interstate shipments involved in these actions were found to be tainted or stale.

On December 19, 1931, and January 4, 1932, the United States attorney for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, acting upon reports by the Secretary of Agriculture, filed in the District Court of the United States for the district aforesaid libels praying seizure and condemnation of 164 cases of canned salmon, remaining in the original unbroken packages in part at Nanticoke, Pa., and in part at Scranton, Pa., alleging that the article had been shipped by Libby, McNeill & Libby, from Seattle, Wash., on or about September 26 and October 15, 1931, and had been transported from the State of Washington into the State of Pennsylvania and charging adulteration in violation of the food and drugs act. The article was labeled in part: (Can) "Happy-Vale Brand Pink Salmon * * Packed for Emery Food Co., Chicago."

It was alleged in the libels that the article was adulterated in that it con-

sisted in part of a decomposed animal substance.

The Emery Food Co., Chicago, Ill., entered an appearance and claim admitting the material allegations of the libels and consenting to the entry of a decree. On February 5, 1932, judgment of condemnation was entered and it was ordered by the court that the product be delivered to the claimant, upon the execution of bonds totaling \$840. The decrees further ordered that the claimant make a separation of the good and bad salmon; that the portion segregated as good be submitted to this department for final determination and that all salmon so determined to be good might be released unconditionally; that the portion determined by this department to be bad should be disposed of in manner not contrary to the provisions of the food and drugs act; and that claimant pay all costs. On May 26, 1932, the decrees were amended to permit shipment of the goods to Seattle, Wash., there to be segregated in accordance with the terms of the decrees.